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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present a model of international environmental agreements in the 
presence of threshold effects. The model is in the tradition of models of international 
environmental agreements formulated as games in partition function form. Games in 
partition function form allow the incorporation of external effects between players. The 
model is applied to global climate change agreements. The agreement involves a contract 
between nations as to the level of abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and how these 
benefits are to be shared. Benefits to emissions abatement are subject to a threshold. 
Consequently, we model climate as a global threshold public good. This allows a 
mechanism to explore incentives and disincentives for signing agreements consequent to 
a critical number of other players committing to an agreement. We show that thresholds 
may destabilize what would be an otherwise stable agreement and that combining an 
emissions tax with an international agreement can be used to restore stability. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Climate change, water security, and the loss of biological diversity are some of the most 
important environmental problems that undermine the sustainability of the modern 
interconnected economies. All these problems share a common thread in that 
uncoordinated individual actions are contributing to the depletion of commonly held 
property that form an integral part of the global natural environment. The uncertainties 
relating to the nature of cause and effect and the inability to hold individuals to account 
for damage makes it necessary to reach a solution through cooperation. International 
Environmental Agreements (IEAs) negotiated between nations are an example of a global 
policy instrument designed to improve global welfare. The challenge in the IEAs has 
been to  make them not only profitable, but also self-enforcing, due in part for incentives 
for nation to join and remain committed in their own self-interest (Fuentes-Albero, & 
Rubio 2010). 
 
The literature on the minimum number of players needed to form an effective 
international environmental agreement (IEA) includes Cararro, et al. (2004).  In their 
work, the  participation problem is formulated as a three-stage game where players 
choose the minimum proportion of the total number of players who must be signatories in 
the first stage of the game. In this paper, we argue that it is not so much the number of 
players but their contribution to emissions or abatement is the central issue. We therefore 
  
model IEA as a game in partition function form with a threshold or provision point public 
bad, namely greenhouse gas emissions. Games in partition function form were first 
proposed by Thrall and Lucas (1963) and later applied to strategic cooperation in 
international environmental agreements ), for example by Chander and Tulkens (1997) 
and, McQuillin (2008) 
 
Barratt (1994) also uses a similar set-up although in his model Chander and Tulkens' 
damage function takes the form of a benefit function, and emissions are replaced with 
abatement levels.  In that model, the transformation function becomes a cost function. 
The differences, however, do not appear to be essential in informing the outcome.  
 
In this paper, we examine how a threshold or provision point affects the partial agreement 
equilibrium. In other words, does a high threshold - an emissions level that is unlikely to 
be reached, leading to a smaller group of signatories in equilibrium? Then, can a partial 
agreement equilibrium induce emissions levels that drive the ambient greenhouse gas 
concentration below the provision point? This is really the key practical question, 
because if this is not the case, then IEA will be ineffective in eradicating damage. 
Perhaps eradication of damage is wishful thinking and in a world where damage is 
continuous and thresholds don’t play a role this is indeed the case. On the other hand, we 
may not have exceeded a critical threshold, or if we have, we may not have exceeded by 
too much, and still through sensible management practices, able to push ambient 
greenhouse gas concentrations back below some threshold. An important question is: Are 
IEA with a limited number of signatories able to do this? We examine this question 
below. 
 
2. The Model 
The model is based on Chander (2007) and Chander and Tulkens (1997). We consider a 
game between N players or countries where N={1,…,n}. Furthermore, we will consider a 
partition of this set such that: ( )mSSP ,,1 K=  and NS jmj ==1U
 .
Where, for all 
∅=∩≠ ji SSji ,  and we will refer to this partition as a coalition structure.  
  
 
Commodities are of two types: a private good niyi ,,1, K=  and a public bad  which 
represents the ambient level of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere (e.g. 
CO2)2. The private good iy  is related to greenhouse gas emissions ie  according to the 
following transformation function: 
 
( ) Niegy ii ∈= ,  and ∑
∈
=
Ni
iez                                          (1) 
 
Our model then departs somewhat from the Chander and Tulkens (1997) framework by 
introducing the idea that environmental damage (i.e. climate change) should be 
considered a threshold public good. In other words emissions only induce damage when 
the ambient level of greenhouse gases exceeds some threshold which in the threshold 
public goods literature is typically referred to as a provision point. Consequently we 
model consumer preferences in terms of a provision point mechanism: 
 
( ) ( ),, zvyzyu iii −=  if 0zz >  and ( ) iii yzyu =,  if 0zz ≤              (2) 
 
Where the provision point 0z  may be interpreted as a threshold below which total 
emissions are insufficient to induce environmental damage in the sense of global 
warming.  
 
We now proceed as follows: first, we determine the Pareto efficient allocation in each of 
these cases before defining the γ -characteristic function and γ -core of the game.  Then 
we analyze for each case the conditions under which a partial agreement equilibrium (a 
particular type of Nash equilibrium for partition function form games) exists before 
proceeding to study how the existence of a “provision point” may impact on the Chander-
Tulkens solution to the game.  
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 Because the model is essentially static ambient C02 concentration just equals the sum of the emissions. 
  
If ( )**1 , nee K  are the Pareto efficient emissions then for the first case the first order 
conditions are given by ( ) ( )zvneg i ′=′ * and in the second case one obtains ( ) 0* =′ ieg . 
From the latter condition we can deduce that 0
0
=
= zzdz
dv for some 0>n . These 
conditions are interesting because, assumption 4 of Chander and Tulkens (1997) allows 
for threshold public goods but they do not analyze the formation of international 
environmental agreements in terms of this threshold but only in order to set-up the 
damage function. In their later work they drop this specification and assume away a 
provision point - this allows them to weaken the assumptions they require regarding 
concavity of the transformation function.  
 
We now consider the case where emissions are above the threshold in more detail. In 
terms of a strategic game first we define the strategy space { }00: eeeT iii ≤≤= , and 
nTTT ××= K1  and utility profile ( )nuuu K,1= . This defines a game ( )uTN ,,=Γ . 
Denote the Nash equilibrium of this game by ( )nee K,1 . Given a coalition structure P we 
can define a coalitional equilibrium as 
( ) ( ) mjeevege
j jj
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Note that this implies that 0
\
zee
jj SNk
k
Si
i >+ ∑∑
∈∈
. 
We now consider second case in which emissions are below the threshold in more detail. 
In this case the coalitional equilibrium plays no role and one obtains ( ) nieg i ,...,1,0 ==′ , 
in other words the game theoretic character of the problem disappears and each country 
unilaterally determines emissions level as they see fit. Their emissions have no impact on 
each-other.  
3. The γ -characteristic function 
We now consider a partition consisting of a coalition S and a number of individual 
players, the coalitional equilibrium now takes the form (partial agreement equilibrium): 
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The first of these gives the conditions under which the coalition S maximizes welfare and 
the second gives the best-response of a non-member of the coalition to the optimal 
emissions decisions of the coalition. We now introduce the γ -characteristic function: 
( ) ( )∑ ∑
∈ ∈ 
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Therefore the γ -characteristic function gives an expression for the surplus welfare 
generated by coalition members. In the event that emissions are constrained to not exceed 
the threshold the disutility term in each of these expressions will be zero. This completes 
the set-up of the model. 
 
The rest of our paper considers the implications of thresholds for proposition 5 of 
Chander and Tulkens (1997). Proposition 5 is here re-stated without proof in slightly 
modified form. 
 
Proposition 1: For all ( ) ( ),,2,, * zvzvnSNSNS s ′≥′≥≠⊂ where Sn denotes the size of 
coalition S  and corresponds to the Nash (disagreement) equilibrium z   and Pareto 
efficient levels of ambient emissions *z  respectively. Then the emission level of each 
player in the coalition of a partial agreement equilibrium is not higher than the emission 
level corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. 
  
 
The result as stated here relies on symmetry of the disutility of ambient emissions. This 
assumption was not made in Chander and Tulkens (1997) but is made in later work, e.g. 
Chander (2007). 
 
Our first result is a corollary of this. This result is not really surprising and rather obvious 
however it is presented because it will be referred to later.  
 
Proposition 2: Given the validity of proposition 1 there is some minimal size of the 
coalition that guarantees at least one signatory to the agreement. 
 
Proof: Proposition 1 implies that zzz ≤≤ ˆ* , however, strict concavity of the damage 
function implies ( ) ( )zvzv ′>′ *  (see figure 1). This implies 1<≥ εSn . If *z  is less than 
the threshold then coalition size will be large as long as the disagreement equilibrium 
does not induce emissions that are too large. In other words if one is already too far above 
the threshold the coalition size will be small. ■ 
 
 
 
damage 
v(z) 
z 
Z0 
  
 
Figure 1: damage or disutility function 
 
 
Because the harmful emissions threshold for 'dangerous global warming' is not precisely 
known, it is important to analyse how to reduce emissions if the coalition membership 
were to remain below the critical membership threshold?  
 
Consider the following situation. Initially 0zz > , however, as a result of the agreement 
emissions zˆ  are reduced to a level: 0ˆ zz < . We assume here that emissions under the 
Pareto-optimal outcome are even lower. In other words, we assume both the potential for 
the success in terms of emission reductions of a full agreement and the success on the 
same terms of a 'partial agreement equilibrium'. This however has as a consequence that 
ex-post each player maximizes their own private benefits to emissions and that 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) iegegeg iii ∀=′=′=′ ,0ˆ* . 
 
It is possible that this behaviour could induce an aggregate level of emissions that would 
be once again lie above the threshold. Therefore, any viable agreement requires an 
additional condition for it to be workable and effective in keeping emissions below the 
harmful threshold. We term this condition ex-post robustness. It is likely related to the 
idea of ex-post implementation and robust implementation in the mechanism design 
literature, however that literature is largely non-cooperative in nature rather than 
cooperative [see for example, Bergemann & Morris (2008, 2009)]. Firstly we define the 
ex-post emissions equilibrium as follows. 
 
Definition 1: Ex-post emissions equilibrium . 
 
( ) ( ) Niege iNiepi ∈∀=∈ ,maxarg  
 
  
Note that this is not the same as the disagreement equilibrium, which is defined in terms 
of damage from emissions. The ex-post equilibrium assumes that damaging levels of 
emissions have been eradicated although not necessarily that all emissions have been 
eradicated. 
 
Definition 2: Ex-post robustness. A partial agreement equilibrium ( )
SNjSiji ee \,ˆ,ˆ ∈∈ is said 
to be ex-post robust iff 0zz ep ≤ . 
If the agreement were not ex-post robust, then self-interested behavior of all parties 
whether signatories or not after successful reduction of emissions would lead to 
emissions again increasing to a new level above the provision point threshold which 
would trigger the need for a new agreement. Essentially the initial IEA would not be time 
consistent, although fully exploring time consistency properties would require 
development of a multi-period or fully dynamic model of IEA’s (see recent work by 
Pavlova, 2008). 
 
Example 1:  
Consider the following utility function ∑−−=
i
iiii ecbeaeu 2 . This utility function 
assumes a linear damage function above the threshold. This induces a partial agreement 
equilibrium as follows: 
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treaty is successful in reducing emissions this will be less than 0z . However, the ex-post 
equilibrium induced emissions are 
b
a
nz ep
2
= . Clearly, zz ep ˆ> . Nevertheless, there 
  
clearly could exist a 0z , such that .ˆ0 zzz ep >>  So that the treaty, on being implemented, 
would create incentives for individuals to again pollute to damaging levels.   
 
The threshold could however be even larger than the ex-post emissions level, which 
would make the success of the treaty even greater in terms of emissions reductions and 
return us to a state of the world predating the era of human induced climate change. More 
likely however is that an agreement will be moderately successful in controlling 
emissions because the threshold itself for inducing damage is not that great or we have 
not already passed it by much. A low threshold is easy to cross again, and this makes for 
IEA that are unlikely to be ex-post robust. 
 
We now turn to the key question that we proposed in the introduction how in equilibrium 
is the number of signatories affected by the threshold level? Assuming a utility function 
∑−−=
i
iiii ecbeaeu 2  like that of the previous example, then we can state the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: ( ) 12 0 +−−≥
c
bzcan
nS  
 
Proof: a partial agreement equilibrium for the quadratic utility function implies 
( )
0
2
2
1
2
ˆ z
b
cn
b
ca
nz S ≤
−
−
−
=  rearranging one obtains ( ) 12 0 +−−≥
c
bzcan
nS ■ 
 
Clearly, our initial intuition is valid, and in this case, a higher threshold for pollutants 
would in equilibrium result in a lower minimum threshold for membership of the 
coalition in an agreement that reduces emissions below damaging levels. This should be 
interpreted to mean that it would be hard to gain signatories to agreements if the damage 
threshold is high. Low thresholds which are easily crossed on the other hand and for 
which the success of emissions reductions is easily achieved correspond to situations for 
  
which it is  easier to obtain commitment for a binding agreement. The downside of such 
agreements is that they may well not be robust as the previous example illustrates.  
 
Next we explore how the conditions for internal and external stability of an agreement 
and the use of transfer payments in achieving stability. 
4. Ex-post solution of a partial IEA 
 
What consequences might thresholds have for transfers between members of a coalition? 
Consider the Chander and Tulkens transfer mechanism. This determines transfers 
between players that guarantee internal and external stability of the agreement. However, 
these transfers do not relate to the robustnesss of the agreement ex-post. Consequently, 
the Chander Tulkens solutions concept is an ex-ante solutions concept.  
 
Chander-Tulkens transfers are defined as follows: 
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The transfer iT  is positive for a transfer received and negative for transfers made. These 
transfers act to compensate players for losses due to environmental damage. The C-T 
transfer mechanism essentially applies a proportional rule to distribute the surplus of the 
grand coalition along with the opportunity cost associated with unanimous agreement 
amongst all players. It is worth noting that because the good in question is a global public 
good, these transfers are paid to all players whether or not they are signing members of a 
coalition. 
 
Note because we follow Chander (2007) in assuming that damage from climate change is 
a pure public bad and therefore identical for all players. The marginal damage does not 
appear in the Chander-Tulkens transfer formula. Consequently the threshold will not 
  
impact on transfers directly, but it will have an impact in equilibrium as the following 
example illustrates. 
 
Example 2: Chander-Tulkens mechanism with threshold 
Using the quadratic utility function from of the last example, however, with different 
parameters for different players, we can compute the Pareto efficient emissions, to be: 
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And the disagreement equilibrium is: 
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This results in the following transfers if emissions are above the threshold.  
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Simplifying, 
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Can we place a bound on transfers based on the bound on coalition size? To do this we 
need to distinguish ex-post and ex-ante cases. 
 
However c is zero if aggregate emissions are below the threshold. So we need to 
distinguish the following cases: 
i. emissions below the threshold 0=iT  
ii. emissions above the threshold 
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Therefore we only need to consider the latter case in which emissions are above the 
threshold.  
 
In this case transfers do depend on the threshold. If we consider the lower bound of 
transfers, i.e. the minimum level of transfers necessary to maintain an agreement then we 
can examine how an increase in the threshold impacts transfers. This is of interest 
because it is unclear where such a threshold may lie. Estimates of what level of emissions 
are likely to be damaging vary.  
 
As discussed earlier there clearly could exist a 0z , such that .ˆ0 zzz ep >>  So that the 
treaty, on being implemented, would create incentives for individuals to again pollute to 
  
damaging levels. The question we now pose is whether a policy can be devised to 
exclude this possibility? In other words can we design a policy that guarantees ex-post 
robustness of any international environmental agreement? Firstly, note that we will 
assume an ex-ante successful treaty in other word ́ < . However to guarantee ex-post 
robustness as we define it here we need ex-post emissions also to remain below the 
threshold. For the quadratic utility example ex-post emissions are given by  =  	
. 
While n is clearly independent of policy.  a, and b represent the marginal private benefit 
of emissions and 2b the marginal private cost of emissions. Lowering the marginal 
private benefit of emissions or raising the marginal private cost of emissions would lead 
to a reduction of ex-post emissions. If these can be reduced to a level below the damage 
threshold then we would have achieved our goal of reducing emissions below the 
threshold ex-post as well. The most obvious way of achieving this would be to couple 
negotiations on international environmental agreements to emissions taxes.  This case 
will be considered in section 6. 
 
A second issue raised by Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) is the case of transfers 
between rich and poor countries that may possess different cost structures. For example 
in our set-up the cost of emissions damages may vary across countries if there were for 
example an income effect on peoples willingness to pay for abatement or alternatively 
willingness to accept various emissions levels. This leads to consider transfer payments 
with heterogenous damage costs.  We do not pursue this here.  Finally, we clarify the 
impact of threshold effects on the -core of the game. 
5. Thresholds and the  −core 
 
In this section we analyse the   −core with thresholds and examine the impact of 
thresholds on the  −core. In order to characterize the   −core we first need to introduce 
some definitions which we have hitherto not required.   
 
Definition 3 Feasible states are vectors , ,  ≡ , . . , ; , . . , ;  
Such that 
  
 ≤∈∈  
And 
 
 =∈  
 
Definition 4 A Pareto efficient state of the economy is a feasible state , ,  such that 
there exists no other feasible state , ,  for which  ,  ≥   for all " ∈ # 
with strict inequality holding for at least one i.  
 
The procedure employed by Chander and Tulkens to demonstrate non-emptiness of the   −core is to first define a strategy for the game and then show that this lies in core of 
game. An alternative procedure was employed by Helm who extended the Bondareva-
Shapley theorem to a game with multilateral externalities.  
 
Definition 5   A strategy of the coalition N is said to belong to the core of the 
corresponding game #,$ if the the payoff it yields for each coalition is larger than the 
payoff $% that any coalition % ⊂ # can achieve. 
 
Chander and Tulkens proved non-emptiness of the core for the case of symmetric 
production functions and asymmetric non-linear damage functions.  Here we consider the 
case of asymmetric production functions and symmetric damage functions. We follow 
Helm (2001) with some modifications based on Osborne and Rubinstein’s (1994)  
presentation of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem. 
 
Definition 6 A game is said to be balanced iff     ∑ ()$% ≤ *#)⊂+  for all balanced 
collection of weights, where ())∈+ is a balanced collection of weights if the sum of () 
summed over all coalitions S containing I is 1. 
 
Proposition 4  For  ≤  the core of the game is ex-post empty. 
  
 
Proof: To prove this we begin by using Helm’s approach to proving non-emptiness of the  −core. This applies the Bondareva-Shapley theorem to games with multilateral 
environmental externalities. We begin by assuming that the game is balanced and 
therefore *# ≥ ∑ ()$,%)   
First recall that the the γ -characteristic function is given by 
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And that in the event of emissions falling below the threshold the damage function will 
drop-out. In this case the characteristic function becomes 
$,% = -.∈)  
Ex_post robustness means that  ≤  and that damages remain at zero. If the game is 
balanced ex-ante and the core is non-empty then ex-ante a successful treaty results in 
()$,% ≤()-. =-.() =-.∈)∋ = *#∈∈)∈+)∈+  
In the ex-post non-robust case the characteristic function becomes  
 
$,% = 012 − * 3 44∈∈ 56∈)  
If the ex-post equilibrium induces an outcome in the core then this results in the 
following balanced game condition 
 
  
()$,%)∈+
≤()012 − * 3 44∈∈ 56∈))∈+
=012 − * 3 44∈∈ 56() =0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)∋∈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The last step is true because otherwise there would be no-incentive to move from the ex-
ante position to the ex-post position. In other words you would not deviate from an 
agreement ex-post unless the net gain from deviating were greater than that from the 
payoff you would receive from adhering to the agreement. This will be the case if the 
slope of the production function is greater than that of the damage function and this will 
occur only if emissions lie below the Pareto optimal level but above the threshold. Which 
is by proposition 1 impossible so that we conclude the postulated outcome is not in the 
core. To see this recall the first-order conditions for a Pareto optimim in this model  = * and proposition 1. 
 
The result is that after dropping intermediate terms: 
 
()$,% > *#)∈+  
In the ex-post robust case the balanced game condition gives 
 
()$,% ≤()12 = 12() = 12∈)∋ >-.∈ = *#∈∈)∈+)∈+  
Consequently the game is not balanced.• 
 
Note that non-coalition members would also increase emissions under these 
circumstances as they are not penalized by environmental damage if emissions fall below 
the threshold. However in the ex-post equilibrium there is really no asymmetry in 
  
behavior between signatories and non-signatories of an agreement because each acts in 
their own self interest and strategic considerations do not play a role (the game theoretic 
aspect of the problem disappears when there are no damages).  
 
Threshold effects raise questions about the robustness of IEA’s  that are a concern if post-
implementation of the agreement emissions rise again to damaging levels, this may or 
may not be a problem depending on the specific incentives of individual countries. While 
stable agreements seem possible in world without thresholds the possible existence of 
thresholds can create incentives to deviate from successful agreements. 
 
6. Can an emissions tax stabilize an agreement ex-post? 
 
An emissions tax such as a carbon tax would raise the marginal private cost of emissions. 
A carbon tax might therefore complement transfer and compensation policies. How high 
would such a tax need to be in order to lead to lasting stable agreements? To answer this 
question, we reformulate the above model by incorporating an emissions tax. We develop 
the analysis by way of an example. Consider the utility function with linear damages 
above the threshold: 
 
  = 8 − 9
 − : − ;<  
Where : is now an emissions tax such as a carbon tax per unit of emissions. Now 
consider the partial agreement equilibrium in the presence of a carbon tax on emissions: 
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The assumption here is that the agreement now consists of an emissions agreement and a 
harmonized emissions tax. Consequently non-signatories do not incu a tax. Admittedly 
one could conceive of a situation where a country prefers a tax to an emissions agreement 
and therefore does not sign the emissions agreement but does impose a tax. We do not 
consider this situation. 
 
For the utility function that is considered here by way of example the partial agreement 
equilibrium would be as follows: 
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The ex-post equilibrium with tax is given by 
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We turn now to characterizing the ex-post γ-core; We skip the preliminaries as they were 
covered in the previuous discussion of the ex-post γ-core without an emissions tax. 
Instead we concentrate on the balanced game condition with the emissions tax which is 
given by the following condition: 
  
()$,%)∈+
≤()012 − : − * 3 44∈∈ 56∈))∈+
=012 − : − * 3 44∈∈ 56())∋∈
=012—: − * 3 44∈∈ 56 ≥∈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We know that for a zero tax rate the final inequality in the expression is strict. However a 
positive tax rate will reduce the left-hand side of this inequality and if chosen to be 
sufficiently large could result in equality. As we are free to choose the tax rate through 
policy, this condition suggests choosing the emissions tax to balance the game such that    
()$,% ≤-.∈)∈+ = *# 
This will be the case if one chooses a tax rate such that: 
 
: > ∑ >12 − *1∑ 44∈ 2?∈ − ∑ -.∈∑ ∈  
In other words taxes per unit of emissions need to be set at least as large as the ratio of 
aggregate need benefits from deviating from the agreement ex-post less aggregate 
benefits of a successful agreement per unit of aggregate emissions resulting from ex-post 
deviation. If the tax were set less than this then the benefits from deviating would 
outweigh the costs of sticking to the agreement and the agreement would fall apart. 
  
A sufficiently high tax rate therefore results in in non-emptiness of the ex-post γ-core. 
Consequently, there is a policy measure available to stable international environmental 
  
agreements ex-post even in the presence of thresholds and a parameter constellation that 
suggests countries would have an incentive to deviate from successful agreementst. We 
have constructed this solution so that the tax is part of the initial agreement, in other 
words an tax is imposed ex-ante to deal with a problem that might emerge ex-post. This 
avoids “band-aid” solutions such as only imposing the tax ex-post to deal with deviations 
once they are observed. As a result the tax will also have an ex-ante impact in that 
emissions will be reduced due to the tax, this means that negotiated emissions reductions 
need be less stringent if coupled to other emissions reduction mechanisms. The tax will 
support emissions reductions efforts rather than hinder them.  
 
It is worth noting however that not every country may be willing to impose private 
sanctions on its citizens in order to guarantee a successful outcome. The 
unconstitutionality of the proposed French carbon tax springs to mind. However even if a 
small number of countries were to impose such sanctions it may be sufficient to reduce 
ex-post emissions below threshold levels. Consequently, robust and successful IEA’s are 
likely to require a mix of both transfer  mechanisms designed to gain agreement to agree 
to emissions reductions as well as some type of private sanctions, mostly likely, tax 
instruments, in order to guarantee that successful agreements do not evaporate once they 
have served their purpose.
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper presents a model of IEAs under the assumption that the global climate is an 
environmental threshold good. The agreement involves consensus between nations as to 
the level of abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and how the net benefits are to be 
shared. The model is used to examine incentives and disincentives for signing agreement 
due to a critical number of other players consenting to commit. The model is used to 
represent an IEA as a provision point mechanism and explore implications for the 
number of signatories needed to successfully reduce emissions below a harmful 
  
threshold. The central issue in climate change policy is to bring parties to a consensus 
regarding the level of harmful ambient greenhouse gas concentrations while the business 
as usual case continue to build the greenhouse gas levels with the increasing potential for 
concentrations to reach the unknown critical threshold. Not taking action then 
predisposes the global community an increasing risk of damage. 
We examined whether a high threshold - an emissions level that is unlikely to be reached, 
could lead to a smaller group of signatories in equilibrium? Then, can a partial agreement 
equilibrium induce emissions levels that drive the ambient greenhouse gas concentration 
below the provision point? This is really the key practical question, because if this is not 
the case, then IEA will be ineffective in eradicating damage. 
Our findings allow us to conclude that a higher threshold for pollutants would in 
equilibrium result in a lower minimum threshold for membership of the coalition in an 
agreement that reduces emissions below damaging levels. This should be interpreted to 
mean that it would be hard to gain signatories to agreements if the damage threshold is 
high. Low thresholds which are easily crossed on the other hand and the success of which 
is easily achieved are easier to obtain commitment for a binding agreement. The 
downside of such agreements is that they may well not be robust as individual signatories 
may chose to defect because the benefits are shared by all nations whether or not they 
sign the agreement. 
Our analysis complements that of Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) who found that 
heterogeneity between countries has no relevant effects on the scope of environmental 
cooperation in comparison with the homogeneous case if transfers are not allowed. With 
transfers, effects depend on the kind of asymmetry. If abatement costs are different, only 
limited cooperation can be bought through transfers. On the contrary, if the countries 
differ in terms of environmental damages, the level of cooperation increases with the 
degree of asymmetry.  
We aim to extend our analysis to consider how potential high abatement costs for 
developed nations can be a factor in inducing greater international cooperation.  
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